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JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court had jurisdiction in this matter pursuant
to Subsection 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii ) of the Utah Code, since the matter
involves a review a final order in formal adjudicative proceedings
originating with the State Tax Commission.

The Supreme Court

transferred this matter to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Subsection
78-2-2(4) of the Utah Code.

The Court of Appeals now has jurisdiction

in this matter pursuant to Subsection 78-2a-3(2)(k) of the Utah Code.
Jurisdiction was invoked by means of a Petition for Writ
of Review filed in compliance with Rule 14. (a) of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure, namely, the Petition for Writ of Review dated
March 6, 1992 and filed on Monday March 9, 1992, seeking review of
the respondent's Final Decision issued on February 6, 1992.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case was initiated by or before the respondent agency
before January 1, 1988. Therefore, case law on the standard of
review applicable before that date applies to this matter.

Morton

lntfl, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).
1.

Was it unreasonable for respondent to require petitioner

to collect much more sales tax from a buyer who purchased a water
softener after even a minimal period of leasing it than from a
buyer who bought it without first leasing it at all?

This involves

some deference to respondent's expertise in the interpretation
of the statutes which respondent is empowered to administer.
Id. at 586.

2
2.

Did respondent fail to comply with the Utah

Administrative Rulemaking Act in requiring petitioner to remit
much more sales tax for each buyer who purchased a water softener
after even a minimal period of leasing it than respondent required
for a buyer who bought it without first leasing it at all where no
rule covering the situation had been promulgated?

This is a

question of statutory interpretation, with no deference to respondent's
expertise.

Idl. at 585.
3.

Was it unreasonable for respondent to require petitioner

to remit much more sales tax than petitioner had collected from
buyers who each purchased a water softener after even a minimal
period of leasing it where in good faith petitioner had collected
the same amount of sales tax as respondent's rules required be
collected from a buyer who bought a water softener without first
leasing it?

This involves some deference to respondent's expertise

in the interpretation of the statutes which respondent is empowered
to administer.
4.

Id.

at 586.

Did respondent violate petitioner's due process

rights by requiring petitioner to remit much more sales tax than
petitioner had collected from buyers who each purchased a water
softener after even a minimal period of leasing it where in good faith
petitioner had collected the same amount of sales tax as respondent's
rules required be collected from a buyer who bought a water softener
without first leasing it?

This is a question of constitutional

interpretation, with no deference to respondent's expertise.
Id. at 585.
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STATUTES, ETC., TO BE INTERPRETED
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances,
rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative
consist of the following:
Sales and Use Tax Act, Chapter 12 of Title 59 of the
Utah Code, and particularly subsection 59-12-102(13)(b):
"Tangible personal property" does not include:
(i) real estate or any interest therin or
improvements thereon;
Rules promulgated in connection with that Chapter including
the following:
Rule R865-19-32S:
A. The lessor shall compute sales or use tax on amounts
received or charged pursuant to rental or lease agreements
which are made in lieu of outright sales. ...
B. ... Examples of taxable leases would be neon signs
and custom made signs on the premises of the lessee ....
Rule R865-19-51S:
D. Labor to install tangible personal property to
real property is exempt, whether the personal property
becomes part of the realty or not. ...
E. Tangible personal property which is attached to real
property, but remains personal property, is subject to
sales tax on the retail selling price of the personal
property, and installation charges are exempt if separately
stated. If the retailer does not segregate the selling
price and installation charges, the sales tax applies to
the entire sales price, including installation charges.
Rule R865-19-58S:
A. Sale of tangible personal property to real property
contractors and repaimen of real property is generally
subject to tax.
1. The person who converts the personal property into
real property is the consumer of the personal property
since he is the last one to own it as personal property.
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Rule R865-19-78S:
B. ... Charges for labor to install personal property
to realty are not subject to tax . . .
Section 63-46a-3, Utah Code:
(2) In addition to other rulemaking required by law, each
agency shall make rules when agency action:
(a) authorizes, requires, or prohibits an action;
(b) provides or prohibits a material benefit;
(c) applies to a class of persons or another agency;
and
(d) is explicitly or implicitly authorized by statute,
(3) Rulemaking is also required when an agency issues a
written interpretation of a state or federal legal mandate.
Due process clause of the Utah Constitution, Article 1,
Section 7:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
Due process clause of the United States Constitution,
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment:
No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law ....
42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceedings for redress. ...
42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988:
... In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision
of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, ... the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner had manufactured and then sold and leased
water softeners for a period of about 15 years.

After about the

first 5 years, petitioner learned that it had been collecting too
much sales tax.

It confirmed with respondent at that time that

when a water softener was sold, it became oart of the real property.
Therefore, petitioner had been the consumer of the materials and a
sales or use tax would only apply to the cost of the materials
petitioner had used.
After a quitting that business for about 14 years,
oetitioner resumed its water softener business as before.

At that

time petitioner contacted respondent to make sure it should continue
to collect and remit sales and use taxes as it had done before.
However, after a couple of years, respondent audited oetitioner for
1985 and 1986, claimed that a deficiency existed for this oeriod,
and eventually collected more than $15,000 from oetitioner because
of additional taxes respondent asserted should have been collected.
Petitioner had employed a marketing strategy of leasing
the water softeners, and then after a couole of months, when the
advantages of soft water had become evident to the customer,
petitioner would often be able to sell the unit.

Petitioner had

collected and remitted the same amount of tax when a sale resulted
during the initial months of a lease as it had for any other sale.
Respondent demanded and obtained four or five times as much tax as
was collected, claiming that since there had been a period of
leasing, a sales tax was owing on the entire sales price, not just
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on the cost of the materials.
The facts in more detail are as follows, with citations
to the Record from the Agency (R.) and the Transcript of Proceedings
(T. ):
1.

The tax in question is sales tax, and the audit

period at issue is January 1, 1985 through December 31, 1986.
2.

R. 4.

The Petitioner has three different types of transactions

with its customers who want a water softener unit.

Water softeners

are provided on one of the following bases:
(1) The water softener is leased to the customer
on a monthly rental agreement, which usually results in a rental
period of two to three years.

Sales tax is imposed on the monthly

lease payment as it is received by the petitioner, and there is no
dispute between the parties as to how these transactions are taxed.
(2) The water softener is sold to the customer on
a furnish and install contract.

On this type of transaction, the

petitioner furnishes the materials and supplies, and installs them
as a water softener on the premises of the customer.

Pursuant to

Commission Rule R865-19-58S, the petitioner pays sales and use tax
on its cost and materials, i.e., petitioner either pays sales tax
to the vendor when materials are purchased, or if the materials
are purchased without the payment of sales tax, the petitioner
pays use tax when the materials are attached to real property.
There is no dispute between the parties as to how these transactions
are taxed.
(3) The water softener is leased to the customer
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for a period of time, but prior to the expiration of the lease the
customer purchases the water softener.

In relation to this appeal

and pursuant to a special promotion of the petitioner, many purchases
were during the first three months of the lease, and customers
were given credit against the purchase price for the payments
which they had made on the lease.

The transactions which are in

dispute in this proceeding are those where the purchase occurred
during the period of the original lease, regardless of whether the
purchase occurred after only three months or after a much lonqer
period of time.
3.

R. 48-49.

The owners of petitioner were previously in the

water softener business from 1956 to 1971 and they re-entered the
water softener business in 1985, always doing business as "Superior
Soft Water."
4.

T. 19-20.
From 1956 until 1961 petitioner collected and remitted

sales tax on the entire amount of retail sales of water softeners.
At that point petitioner learned from a competitor that water
softeners were considered to be real property and sales tax should
not be collected on the total sales price.

Petitioner therefore

requested a hearing with the respondent which hearing confirmed
that the water softener was considered to be real property and
should not be taxed.
5.

R. 6, T. 24.

Prior to that time, in about 1959 respondent had

audited petitioner, but had not informed petitioner that sales tax
was being improperly collected.
6.

T. 25-26, 47.

When petitioner was told at the hearing that taxes
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should not have been collected on sales of water softeners, petitioner
asked respondent about a refund of the tax improperly collected
and remitted.

Respondent would only refund the extra tax it had

received if the refund was passed on to the purchasers.

Petitioner

would receive no benefit but would have to provide the labor to
find the purchasers and distribute the refunded money.

In view of

this burden on petitioner, petitioner declined respondent's offer.
T. 48-49.
7.

Petitioner did not ask respondent if petitioner

would have to collect a different amount of sales or use tax when
a sale took place prior to the end of a lease, and respondent
never suggested it would be treated differently from any other
sale.

R. 6.

An officer of petitioner thought the only issue was

whether a water softener was real or personal property.
8.

T. 44.

Before recommencing operations in 1985, Gerald

B. Lambourne, one of the proprietors of petitioner, contacted the
respondent by telephone to confirm, for sales and use tax purposes,
the correct sales tax treatment of the sale and installation of
soft water systems on commercial and residential real property.
He was informed that water softeners became part of the real
property and were not subject to sales tax, but instead a use tax
was imposed on the cost of materials used in the construction of the
water softener unit.

This advice was consistent with his orior

practice and his prior understanding of the law.
9.

T. 35-36.

In the marketing of water softeners, it was important

for the customer to experience the advantages of soft water before
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having to commit to a purchase.

For that reason, petitioner

frequently entered into a lease of a water softener with the
expectation of being able to convert the lease to a sale very
soon thereafter.
10.

T. 41.

Had petitioner known it would, upon conversion,

have to charge the customer a sales tax on the entire price, it
would at least have separated the cost of the water softener
from the cost of its installation [to obtain the tax benefit under
Part D of Rule R865-19-51S].
11.

T. 40-41.

In view of respondent's position that a water

softener is real property if sold without having been leased
first, and is personal property if first leased for any time at
all, petitioner has found it more practical to allow the prospective
customer to experience soft water by means of a free trial period
rather than by means of a lease.
12.

T. 43.

During the audit period, one of respondent's auditors

purchased a water softener from petitioner after a period of
leasing and was not charged sales tax.

He may not have read the

sales contract, but in any event he did not notify petitioner
that petitioner was following an incorrect course of action in
failing to charge sales tax.
13.

T. 55-65.

Also during the audit period, petitioner had no

guidance from any rule covering the tax treatment of a sale following
some initial period of leasing.
14.

T. 34, 64-65, 68-70.

The original audit report, dated March 12, 1987,

stated that $45,969.40 in tax, $4,596.94 in penalty, and $5,714.33
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interest was owing.

A subsequent audit adjustment on August 16,

1991 had reduced that amount to $11,855.97 in tax, no penalty, and
$2,071.03 in interest.

The resoondent's Auditing Division applied

petitioner's February 16, 1988 payment of $3,000.00 against all of
the interest and $928.97 of the tax obligation.

Then the interest

was updated from February 16, 1988 and that amount was $4,695.32,
as of September 15, 1991.

(Interest accrued daily at $3.59).

Therefore, the respondent's Auditing Division asserted that the
total amount owing as of February 15, 1991, was $15,622.32.
15.

R. 19

Petitioner appealed the assessed amounts and an

informal hearing was held on January 6, 1988, David Angerhofer,
Hearing Officer, presiding.
16.

R. 117.

On May 5, 1988, the respondent issued its informal

decision in this matter, including the following excerpts:
Water softeners which are first leased to a
customer and then sold to that customer are
subject to tax on the monthly rental payments
for the duration of the lease, and are subject
to sales and use tax on the residual sales
price of the later sale of the water softener
to that customer.
...

Water softeners whch are first leased and then
sold to a customer become part of the realty
at the time of sale.
The Auditing Division is hereby ordered to
adjust its assessment in accordance with this
decision. R. 119.
17.

On September 16, 1988, oetitioner's accountant,

Brian C. McGavin, C.P.A., wrote to the respondent on behalf of
petitioner requesting a clarification of the respondent's informal
decision.

R. 113.

James E. Harward, Hearing Officer, answered on
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January 18, 1989, including the following:
3. The sale of a soft water softener unit to
a customer after a lease has expired is also a
taxable transaction. The price paid, typically
the residual value of the water softener at
the conclusion of the lease, should have tax
computed and charged thereon. R. 112.
18.

At some point after January 18, 1989, Gerald Lambourne

of petitioner requested clarification of James Harward's January
18, 1989 letter.
1989.

This was answered by James Harward on Aoril 26,

He first quoted the said paragraph 3, and then stated that:
[W]hen the water softener is sold and installed
by you, you're classified as a real prooerty
contractor and the end consumer, therefore,
you should be paying use tax on your cost of
the water softener because you are installing
the water softener on real prooerty. It
should be treated the same as an outright sale
of the water softener which you install for a
customer in real prooerty. R. 111.
19.

Respondent's Auditing Division filed a Motion

for Reconsideration and Clarification of Informal Decision in this
matter on September 22, 1989.
20.

R. 94-110.

A clarification hearing on the respondent's informal

decision was held on February 6, 1991. R. 48.
21.

On February 27, 1991, the respondent issued its

Order in this matter, clarifying that the decision was meant
to uphold completely the assessment of the Auditing Division, but
waiving any tax not collected because of a misinterpretation by
petitioner of the respondent's decision of May 5, 1988. R. 48-54.
A copy of that Order dated February 27, 1991 is attached hereto.
22.

A Formal Hearing was then held on this matter on

October 29, 1991 before Paul F. Iwasaki, Presiding Officer.

R. 4.
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23.

In a Brief and Memorandum of Points and Authorities

submitted before the hearing, as well as in argument at the hearing,
petitioner presented arguments showing that there was an unreasonably
large additional amount of tax being charged (R. 29, T. 75-76), there
had been no pertinent rule promulgated (R. 29, T. 75), it was
unreasonable to charge petitioner more than petitioner had collected,
since petition had acted in good faith (R. 30-31, T. 77, 82), and
it would violate petitioner's constitutional due process rights to
charge petitioner more than petitioner had collected (R. 29,
T. 77, 83).
24.

The respondent's Final Decision of February 6, 1992

affirmed the prior Informal Decision and subsequent Order, noting
that since the taxable treatment of the conversion of leases to
sales had not come up in discussions between the petitioner and
the respondent, petitioner could not have relied upon the respondent's
advice to its detriment.
25.

R. 8-9.

In order for petitioner to avail itself of judicial

review of that Final Decision, oetitioner had to pay respondent
the full amount respondent calculated was owing, pursuant to Section
59-1-505 of the Utah Code.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

It was unreasonable for respondent to require petitioner

to collect much more sales tax from a buyer who purchased a water
softener after even a minimal period of leasing it than from a
buyer who bought it without first leasing it at all.

The rules

which governed how much sales and use tax was to be paid when a sale
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was made in the first instance would also apply in the case of a
sale after a period of leasing.
2.

Respondent failed to comply with the Utah administrative

Rulemaking Act in requiring petitioner to remit much more sales
tax for each buyer who purchased a water softener after even a
minimal period of leasing it than respondent required for a buyer
who bought it without first leasing it at all where no rule covering
the situation had been promulgated.

The promulgation of a rule

was statutorily required in this case since the agency required an
action by the taxpayer, it orohibited a material benefit, and it
was an agency interpretation of a state legal mandate.
3.

It was unreasonable for respondent to require petitioner

to remit much more sales tax than petitioner had collected from
buyers who each ourchased a water softener after even a minimal
period of leasing it where in good faith petitioner had collected
the same amount of sales tax as respondent's rules required be
collected from a buyer who bought a water softener without first
leasing it.

Petitioner had collected all of the tax it had been

advised to collect after diligent inquiry.

It was harsh and

unjust to retroactively require petitioner to remit more than it
had collected in good faith.
4.

Respondent violated petitioner's due process rights

by requiring petitioner to remit much more sales tax than petitioner
had collected from buyers who each purchased a water softener
after even a minimal period of leasing it where in good faith
petitioner had collected the same amount of sales tax as respondent's
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rules required be collected from a buyer who bought a water softener
without first leasing it.

The lack of rules and other guidelines

left petitioner's duty unconstitutionally vague.

In light of this

lack of clarityf petitioner was deprived of its property in violation
of its due orocess rights.

Petitioner thus has a cause of action

under the Civil Rights Act and is entitled to an award of attorney
fees thereunder.
ARGUMENT
1.

IT WAS UNREASONABLE FOR RESPONDENT TO REQUIRE PETITIONER

TO COLLECT MUCH MORE SALES TAX FROM A BUYER WHO PURCHASED A WATER
SOFTENER AFTER EVEN A MINIMAL PERIOD OF LEASING IT THAN FROM A
BUYER WHO BOUGHT IT WITHOUT FIRST LEASING IT AT ALL.
In a normal sale of a water softener, the difference
between the cost of the materials and the total sales orice is the
amount to install personal property to realty and is not subject
to tax.

It is only reasonable that this rationale would also apply

where the water softener is leased for a period of time before an
option to buy the water softener is exercised.
It is acknowledged by both parties that when petitioner
sells a water softener and installs it onto the premises, it is
not subject to sales tax.

Instead, petitioner is required to oay

use tax on the materials used in the water softener because petitioner
was the consumer of those materials.
Rule R865-19-58S of the Rules of the Commission provides
in part A:
1. The person who converts the personal property into
real property is the consumer of the personal property
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since he is the last one to own it as personal property.
In the case of water softeners, petitioner is the last
one to own the property as personalty.

Therefore petitioner is the

consumer of the property and is subject to tax on the cost of the
materials.

However, petitioner is not subject to tax on the

balance of the total sales price, because that represents the
charge for labor to install the personal property to the realty,
and Rule R865-19-78S provides in part:
Charges for labor to install personal property to realty
are not subject to tax . . .(Emphasis added).
Further, Rule R865-19-51S provides in relevant part:
0. Labor to install tangible personal property to real
prooerty is exempt, whether the personal property becomes
part of the realty or not. (Emphasis added).
In this proceeding, the transactions in issue are those
in which an option to buy was exercised after beginning the transaction
as a lease.
payments.

Tax was correctly collected and remitted on all lease

Petitioner submits that it also correctly paid the tax

on the cost of all materials it attached or installed onto real
property.

Rule 58S makes petitioner the consumer of that property,

and petitioner has complied with the rule by paying the tax. Rule
78S provides that "Charges for labor to install personal property
to realty are not subject to tax . . . "

(Emphasis added).

Those

charges for labor to install personal property to realty are the
only charges on which sales or use tax has not been paid, and the
respondent's own Rule 78S says they "are not subject to tax".
Rule 51S provides almost exactly the same thing and concludes that
labor to install personal property to real property "is exempt".
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Thus, the audit assessment by the respondent cannot be
sustained without the violation of respondent's own rules. That
is not legally permissible so the assessment must be reversed,
2.

RESPONDENT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE

RULEMAKING ACT IN REQUIRING PETITIONER TO REMIT MUCH MORE SALES
TAX FOR EACH BUYER WHO PURCHASED A WATER SOFTENER AFTER EVEN A
MINIMAL PERIOD OF LEASING IT THAN RESPONDENT REQUIRED FOR A BUYER
WHO BOUGHT IT WITHOUT FIRST LEASING IT AT ALL WHERE NO RULE COVERING
THE SITUATION HAD BEEN PROMULGATED.
The respondent could not interpret the law as it did
without first adootina a new rule.
The respondent has adopted a rule to tax the leases of
tangible oersonal property (Rule R865-19-32S), it has adooted
a rule to tax the sale and installation of tangible oersonal
property to real property by contractors such as oetitioner (Rule
R865-19-58S), and it has adooted a rule to exempt the labor and
installation costs to attach tangible personal property to real
property (Rules R865-19-51S and R865-19-78S).

However, there

is no rule anywhere in the rules of the respondent which requires
tax to be paid on the total price of the transaction, including
the cost of labor to install the tangible oersonal oroperty to the
real property, when a lease is converted to a sales and installation
agreement.

If the respondent wants to impose tax on those transactions

at four or five times the rate of a straight sale, the respondent
must first approve that conceot and adopt a rule to give notice to
all taxpayers of the requirement.
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Relevant portions of Section 63-46a-3, Utah Code Annotated,
provide:
(2) In addition to other rulemaking required by law, each
agency shall make rules when agency action:
(a) authorizes, requires, or prohibits an action;
(b) provides or prohibits a material benefit;
(c) applies to a class of persons or another agency;
and
(d) is explicitly or implicitly authorized by statute.
(3) Rulemaking is also required when an agency issues a
written interpretation of a state or federal legal mandate.
In this case, the prooosed agency action requires an
action by the taxpayer, it prohibits a material benefit, and it is
an agency interpretation of a state legal mandate.

The agency

(Tax Commission) is clearly required to adopt rules prior to
taking the proposed action.

Without the agency first adopting

rules, taxpayers are not given any advance notice of the requirements
of the agency.

That is precisely the problem in this proceeding.

The petitionei . lied the Tax Commission and was either given some
erroneous advi

or the policy of the Tax Commission was changed

without proper / giving notice to the taxpaying public through
the rulemaking process.

In either event, the problem could have

either been prevented or the policy could have been enforced if
the respondent had properly adopted a rule.

In the absence of

such a rule, the respondent's Auditing Division cannot pull such a
policy out of the dark closet and impose it on unsuspecting taxpayers.
It is a wrong, which so far has improperly cost this taxpayer
more than $15,000.00 which it did not collect on the sale of the
water softeners.
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This rationale was set forth by the Utah Supreme Court
in the case of Athay v. State, Dept. of Business Regulation, 626
P.2d 965 (Utah 1981).

In that case, the necessity for clear and

comprehensive administrative rules was emphasized.
The legislative grant of authority to the
administrative agency is necessarily in general
language. It is the responsibility of the
administrative body to formulate, oublish and
make available to concerned oersons rules
which are sufficiently definite and clear that
persons of ordinary intelligence will be able
to understand and abide by them. Ij3. at 968.
An example of where there already existed sufficient
clarity, making a rule unnecessary, was Eound in the case of
Plateau Min. v. Utah Div. of State Lands, 802 P. 2d 720 (Utah 1990 ) .
In that case, the agency
lease provision.

interpreted and enforced a

The lease had a royalty orovision which set

forth two different rates, and specified that whichever rate was
higher would be the applicable rate.
Certain lessees asked the Court to re "\±ra the agency to
make a rule before collecting the higher rate.

The Supreme Court

found that there was no need for the promulgation of a rule in
order for the agency "to rely on a known lease orovision."
731.

JEd. at

As the Court had already found, "The language of the lease

provision is clear.

The intent of the parties was that the higher

of the two rates should be paid the State." Id., at 726.
The facts of the Plateau case certainly contrast with
those of the instant matter.

There was no clarity at all in any

statute, rule, agreement, decision, or oral communication of the
respondent regarding the tax to be collected when a lease of a
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water softener was converted to a sale.

The complete lack of

clarity became so apparent that respondent's Auditing Division
requested an interpretation of the first effort made by the respondent
to address the subject of taxing water softeners purchased after
an initial period of leasing.

R. 94.

Furthermore, the oosition of the respondent's auditing
division constituted a change in policy which could not be done
without first adopting a rule.
Currently, as stated above, there is no rule in the
rules of the respondent which impose tax on the full price when a
lease transaction is converted to a sale and installation to real
property.

To now impose tax in that manner constitutes a change

of policy by the respondent.
Mr. Lambourne had been in the water softener business
with petitioner from the first.

When the petitioner recommenced

that business , Mr. Lambourne called the respondent and was informed
that the sale of water softeners was treated as attachments to
real property, which would mean that use tax would be paid on the
cost of the materials attached to real property. That representation
was the way he had previously paid tax on water softeners, it was
the way he understood it had always been done, and it was the way
he was now being told to do it in the future.
Then, when the audit was performed by the Auditing
Division on petitioner, the policy had changed and petitioner was
being hit with at least an $11,000.00 assessment.

The respondent

had never adopted or even proposed a rule change, and the public
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had never been given notice of any such change, but the change in
policy was being imposed on petitioner to the tune of over $11,000. 00
without any opportunity to first collect the tax from the persons
purchasing the water softeners.
Such changes in policy without first going through the
rulemaking
above.

process

is clearly

forbidden by the statute cited

In addition, in Williams v. Public Service Com'n of Utah,

720 P. 2d 773 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court held that an
agency of the State of Utah could not change its long-established
policy without first following the mandates of the Utah administrative
Rule Making Act.

In that case, the Supreme Court said:

Under all these circumstances, we conclude
that the Commission cannot reverse its long-settled
position ... and announce a fundamental oolicy
change without following the requirements of
the Utah Administrative Rule Making Act. See,
e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008
(9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 999,
103 S.Ct. 358, 74 L.Ed.2d 394 (1982), see also
2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise Sec.
7:25, at 125 (2d ed. 1978) . These requirements
were not met. Nonparties were not given notice
of the Commission's intention to reconsider
its long-held position.... And the November
adjudicative hearing certainly cannot be considered
an adequate substitute for a rule making
proceeding. Many of the protections provided
for by the Act were missing from that proceeding ,
including adequate advance notices to all
affected parties , an opportunity to participate,
and an opportunity to comment on the proposed
rule.
U.C.A., 1953, Sec. 63-46a-4
(2d
Repl. Vol. 7A, 1978, Supo. 1985). Because the
requirements of the Act were not satisfied, the
rule is vacated and the matter is remanded for
further proceedings. Id. at 777. (Emphasis
added).
Consistent

with

the

Williams

case,

"the

Commission

cannot reverse its long-settled position and announce a fundamental
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policy

change without following

Administrative Rule Making Act."

the requirements of the Utah
Taxpayers "were not given notice

of the Commission ' s intention to reconsider its long-held position. "
The "protection provided for by the Act were missing, including
adequate advance notices to all affected parties , an opportunity to
participate, and an opportunity to comment."
That is precisely the problem in this proceeding with
this petitioner.
3.

IT

WAS UNREASONABLE FOR RESPONDENT TO REQUIRE

PETITIONER

TO REMIT MUCH MORE SALES TAX THAN PETITIONER HAD COLLECTED FROM
BUYERS WHO EACH PURCHASED A WATER SOFTENER AFTER EVEN A MINIMAL
PERIOD OF LEASING IT WHERE IN GOOD FAITH PETITIONER HAD COLLECTED
THE SAME AMOUNT OF SALES TAX AS RESPONDENT'S RULES REQUIRED BE
COLLECTED FROM A BUYER WHO BOUGHT A WATER SOFTENER WITHOUT FIRST
LEASING IT.
In the attached Order dated February 27, 1991, affirmed
on page 5 of the Final Decision sought to be reviewed, the respondent
affirmed the assessment for taxes for the audit period, 1985
through 1986.

R. 8, 52.

The Order then acknowledged on page 5 that petitioner
may have in good faith misinterpreted the Informal Decision dated
May 5, 1988, and therefore relieved petitioner from paying the
taxes it had not collected as a result of its misinterpretation of
that Decision.

R. 52-53.

However, petitioner had evidenced good faith to at least
the same extent before May 5, 1988.

It had at one time collected
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more than was required by law, collecting and remitting sales tax
on the water softeners sold and installed brand new in real property.
T. 24.

It had been diligent in contacting respondent to make sure

that it was collecting the appropriate amount of tax.

T. 24, 36.

The only possible accusation against petitioner would be
that it did not ask the right question.

Its principal did not ask

about the situation where a water softener initially leased might
be subsequently sold.

T. 44.

But why should the burden have been on him, rather than
on .*ri auditor or member of respondent, to raise that issue?

Why

would he be expected to anticipate a possible difference in the
tax treatment of a sale depending on whether there had been an
initial lease period?

The ones he was talking to would have that

expertise, not him.
Mr. Lambourne was asked, "[D]id you ever soecifically
ask any of the oeople that you've mentioned so far what happens
when you first rent and then sell?"

T. 44.

In response he stated, "I did not ask that soecific
question.

I asked what a water softener was considered to be,

real property or personal property.
real property.

And I was told that it was

There were no stipulations to it.

to ask any other question than that question.

I had no reason

I wanted to know

how the Tax Commission looked at a water softener transaction.
And that was the question that I asked."

Id.

Why should it have occurred to Mr. Lambourne to have
asked that other question?

If a layman were told that a sale of
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his home was a sale of real property for sales tax ourposes, would
it be expected that he would check again if he rented his home for
a while before he sold it?
In view of the fact that good faith existed just as much
before May 5, 1988 as after, why was petitioner required to pay
from its own pocket those taxes it found out after 1986 that it
should have been collecting in 1985 and 1986? If it was inapproprate
to give retroactive effect to the February 27, 1991 Order for the
period between May 5, 1988 and March 1, 1991 in view of the lack
of clarity

(R. 52-53), why wasn't it just as harsh and unjust

to give retroactive effect to that Order for the period of January
1985-December 1986 in view of the lack of clarity that existed
then?
There is a lack of logic and reason to this variant
treatment

that does not warrant this Courtfs deference to the

Final Decision.

That Final Decision was not within the bounds of

reasonableness that would prevent the agency's decision from being
disturbed.
4.

Morton, supra, at 586.

RESPONDENT VIOLATED PETITIONER ? S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BY REQUIRING

PETITIONER TO REMIT MUCH MORE SALES TAX THAN PETITIONER HAD COLLECTED
FROM BUYERS WHO EACH PURCHASED A WATER SOFTENER AFTER EVEN A
MINIMAL PERIOD OF LEASING IT WHERE IN GOOD FAITH PETITIONER HAD
COLLECTED THE SAME AMOUNT OF SALES TAX AS RESPONDENT'S RULES
REQUIRED BE COLLECTED FROM A BUYER WHO BOUGHT A WATER SOFTENER
WITHOUT FIRST LEASING IT.
The due process clauses of the Utah Constitution, Article
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1, Section

7, and the United

States Constitution, Fourteenth

Amendment, each provides that Utah shall not deorive any person of
property without due process of law.
In the case of Athayv. State, Deot. of Business Regulation ,
626 P. 2d 965 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court pointed out that
a failure of a State agency to establish guidelines deorived a
party to that action of rights of due process of law, citing several
federal and state decisions.
As a general rule, if a statute is too vague (and this
is not remedied by aopropriate administrative rules ) , then enforcement
ignores procedural due process because there is insufficient notice.
"Vagueness" goes to the issue of procedural
due process, i.e., whether the statute is
sufficiently explicit and clear to inform the
ordinary reader of common intelligence what
conduct is orohibited. State v. Hoffman, 733
P.2d 502 (Utah 1987). [Emphasis added.]
If a statute deprives a oerson of orooerty on the basis
of a statute that

is not

"sufficiently exolicit and clear to

inform the ordinary reader of common intelligence what conduct is
prohibited," then there is a violation of the due process clauses
of the Utah and United States constitutions.
A criminal statute "must be sufficiently
clear and definite to inform persons of ordinary
intelligence what their conduct must be to
conform to its requirements and to advise one
accused of violatinq it what constitutes the
offense with which he is charged. " [Citations . ]
A statute that does not meet this test is
invalid under both the due process clause of
the fourteenth
amendment
to the federal
constitution, [citation], and its counterpart
in article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution.
State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1986).
[Emphasis added.]
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In the instant matter, there was no statute or rule or
anything else that was "sufficiently clear and definite to inform
persons of ordinary intelligence what their conduct must be to
conform to its requirements" with respect to the collection of
sales and use tax on a water softener leased for a few months and
then sold.

Nevertheless the small business embodied in petitioner

has been deprived of over $15f 000 of its property. This deprivation
has thus been without due process of law.
This deprivation by the respondent, an arm of the State
of Utah, of petitioner's due process rights protected

by the

United States Constitution, acting under the State laws of taxation,
constitutes a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Signore v. City of McKeesport, Pa., 680 F . S U D P . 200
(W.D.Pa. 1988).
Even if this Court does not reach the issue of the
violation of the United States Constitution, a reversal of the
respondent's decision would entitle petitioner to an award of
attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988.

Lorenc v. Call, 789

P. 2d 46 (Utah App. 1990).
In the Lorenc case, an arm of the State of Utah, namely,
Granite School District, denied Lorenc fee waivers.

She argued

that the District policy was more restrictive than the statute,
and that the procedures employed violated her due process rights.
Lorenc prevailed on the basis of the policy being too restrictive,
and the Court of Appeals did not reach the issue of due process.
But the appellate court did recognize that the due process claim was
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not insubstantial, and hence an award of attorney fees was appropriate.
CONCLUSION
As provided for the rules of the respondent, leases of
water softeners are taxable by paying sales tax on the lease
payments, and on water softeners that are sold and installed, use
tax is paid on the cost of the materials which are installed on
the real property. It is unreasonable for respondent to essentially
quadruple the sales tax on a sale if a lease is in place for one
or two months before the water softener is sold.
The rules of the respondent only cover either a lease or
a sale.

The respondent has not adopted any rule which requires

that tax be paid on the total price of the water softener where an
option to buy has been exercised during a lease.

Until such a

rule is properly oromulgated, respondent must not be allowed to
enforce that rule.
Since petitioner has been collecting in good faith all
of the taxes it should have been, it is unreasonable for respondent
to now charge petitioner over $15 ,000 for taxes it did not collect.
Petitioner's

constitutionally

protected

due

process

rights have been violated by respondent' s deprivation of petitioner ' s
property under color of law.
Based upon each of the foregoing , the petitioner oriqinally
properly collected and remitted the correct amount of tax, and
this Court should order that the subsequent amount collected by
the respondent pursuant to the respondent's Decision and Order of
February 6 , 1992 be returned, and that Decision and Order be vacated.
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Furthermore, petitioner should be awarded its costs
including attorney fees herein.
DATED this

2 / ~ " day of

tftLy,

, 1992.

LYNN P. HEWARD & DELWIN T. POND
Attorneys for Petitioner

LYNN P. HEWARD
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four copies of this Brief were
mailed to Susan L. Barnum, Assistant Attorney General, 36 South
State Street, 11th Floor, Salt Lake City, UT
day of

rlcu^.

84111 on this Z°i ~

, 1992, with postage attached thereon,
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
)

SUPERIOR SOFT WATER COMPANY

)

Petitioner,

)

v

*

)

AUDITING DIVISION, UTAH
STATE TAX COMMISSION

)
:

Respondent.

ORDER

Appeal No. 87-1118

:
)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission on
February 6, 1991 on a Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification
of Informal Decision.

G. Blaine Davis, Commissioner, Joe B.

Pacheco, Commissioner, and Paul F. Iwasaki, Administrative Law
Judge, heard the matter for and in behalf of the Commission.
Present and representing the Petitioner was Allen Sims, Attorney at
Law.

Present and

representing

Respondent was- Susan Barnum,

Assistant Attorney General.
The parties had filed briefs and memorandums prior to the
hearing.

The evidence is contained in the file and the facts are

correctly stated in the Informal Decision and are not in dispute.
However, the parties have a different interpretation of the effects
and the practical application of the Informal Decision of the
Commission in this case.
The Petitioner has three different types of transactions
with its customers who want a water softener unit. Water Softeners
are provided on one of the following bases:

1. The water softener is leased to the customer on a
monthly rental agreement, which usually results in a rental period
of two to three years.

Sales tax is imposed on the monthly lease

payment as it is received by the Petitioner, and there is no
dispute between the parties as to how these transactions are taxed.

2. The water

softener

furnish and install contract.

is sold to the customer on a

On this type of transaction, the

Petitioner furnishes the materials and supplies, and installs them
as a water softener on the premises of the customer.

Pursuant to

Commission Rule R865-19-58S, the Petitioner pays sales and use tax
on its cost of materials, i.e., Petitioner either pays sales tax to
the vendor when materials are purchased, or, if the materials are
purchased without the payment of sales tax, the Petitioner pays use
tax when the materials are attached to real property.

There is no

dispute between the parties as to how these transactions are taxed.
3. The water softener is leased to the customer for a
period

of time, but prior to the expiration of the lease the

customer purchases the water softener.
and

pursuant

to

a

special

promotion

In relation to this appeal
of

the

Petitioner,

many

purchases were during the first three months of the lease, and
customers were given credit against the purchase price for the
payments which they had made on the lease.

The transactions which

are in dispute in this proceeding are those where the purchase
occurred during the period of the original lease, regardless of
whether the purchase occurred after only three months or after a
2

much

longer

period

of

time.

The

parties

have

a

different

interpretation of the Order of the Commission# and the Commission
has been asked for its interpretation of the Order as it pertains
to these transactions.
A

portion

of the

Findings

of the

Informal

Decision

relating to these transactions reads as follows:
"Water softeners which are first leased to a
customer and then sold to that customer are
subject to tax on the monthly rental payments
for the duration of the lease, and are subject
to sales and use tax on the residual sales
price on the later sale of the water softener
to that customer. Separate transactions will
have occurred. There is no double taxation."
The Decision and Order of the Informal Decision relating
to these transactions reads as follows:
"Based on the foregoing, it is the Decision
and Order of the Utah State Tax Commission
that water softeners which are sold outright
to the customer and installed become part of
the realty. Water softeners which are leased
to a customer remain personal property. Water
softeners which are first leased and then sold
to a customer become part of the realty at the
time of the sale.
The Auditing Division is hereby ordered to
adjust its assessment in accordance with this
decision."
The position of the Petitioner is that the Decision and
Order is the language that governs when it states that, "Water
softeners which are first leased and then sold to a customer become
part of the realty at the time of the sale." The interpretation of
the Petitioner is that because it is converted to realty at the
time of sale, it should be taxed the same as the sales which are
made on a furnish and install contract, i. e., taxes should be
3

charged only on the cost of materials. They also point out that if
their interpretation of the Decision is not correct, then there is
no need for the language which orders the Auditing Division to
"adjust its assessment in accordance with this decision."
The position of the Respondent is that the wording in the
Findings accurately describes how these transactions are to be
taxed, when it states they "are subject to sales and use tax on the
residual sales price on the later sale of the water softener to
that customer.

Separate Transactions will have occurred."

Upon a reading of the Informal Decision, it is apparent
that the Decision is not clear.

It is understandable why the

parties do not agree on the interpretation of the Decision and why
it requires further interpretation.
The Commission has reviewed the arguments and authorities
presented by the parties, and the statutes and rules relating to
the sales and use tax.

Based on that review, The Commission now

makes and enters the following:
ORDER
1. Purchases of water softeners by customers, either
during or upon the completion of a lease, are taxable sales by the
Petitioner.

Thus, for example, if the sale is for $950.00 less

three lease payments of $12.95 each, or a total of $38.85, then
sales tax must be collected on the purchase price of $911.15
Sales tax would have already been collected on the $38.85 of lease
payments.

This is what was meant in the Findings of Fact when it

stated that such sales after a lease were "subject to sales and use
4

tax on the residual sales price on the later sale of the water
softener to that customer."
2. The above interpretation is also what was intended by
the Decision and Order which stated, "Water softeners which are
leased to a customer remain personal property.

Water softeners

which are first leased and then sold to a customer become part of
the

realty

at the time of ^ale."

The

interpretation

of the

Commission of those two sentences is that the water softeners that
are

leased

have not become real property

but

remain

personal

property.

Because the water softeners were personal property until

they were

leased, they remain personal property when they ar£

purchased by the customer.

Therefore, the full purchase price of

the water softeners, less the lease payments where applicable, is
subject to sales tax.

Only after purchase do the leased wat§r

softeners become part of the realty.
3.
Auditing

The

Division

original
was

and

audit

assessment

is affirmed.

determined

The

sentence

by

the

in the

original Informal Decision ordering the Auditing Division to adjust
its assessment was a standard provision which is placed in most
orders.

That sentence was not intended to relieve the Petitioner

from any responsibility to pay taxes.
4. Because the Petitioner may well have made a good faith
misinterpretation of the Informal Decision, there may not have been
a collection of tax in accordance with the intent of that Decision.
Therefore, if the Petitioner has not collected tax on the full
purchase price of the water softeners in accordance with the above
5

interpretation, the Commission will waive any tax, penalty and
interest which Petitioner did not collect between May 5, 1988 and
March l, 1991 which resulted from its misinterpretation of that
Decision.

This waiver is intended to apply only to the tax,

penalty and interest which may have been caused by the lack of
clarity of the Informal Decision,
Dated this

<Q*1 day of F^HJULQIAAX^

1991.

BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION.

Chairman

Joe B, Pacheco
Commissioner

G. Blaine Davis
Commissioner

NOTICE: You have thirty (30) days after the date of the final
order to file a request for a Formal Hearing.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Order to the following:
Superior Soft Water Company
c/o Gerald B. Lambourne
3575 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
James Rogers
Director, Auditing
Heber M. Wells Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UT 84134
Susan Barnum
Assistant Attorney General
36 South State Street, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
DATED this

^3

day of ^ ^ H J J U O O J O S .

, 1991.
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^

u

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Order to the following:
Superior Soft Water Company
c/o Gerald B. Lambourne
3575 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
James Rogers
Director, Auditing
Heber M. Wells Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UT 84134
Susan Barnum
Assistant Attorney General
36 South State Street, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
DATED this
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day of ? : J 1 K U O J U K V

Secretary
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